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T
he American government’s preventive 
counterterrorism strategy is no secret.1 Weeks 
after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, then-Attorney 
General John Ashcroft declared, “Our single 
objective is to prevent terrorist attacks by taking 
suspected terrorists off the street. Let the terrorists 
among us be warned: If you overstay your visa – even 
by one day – we will arrest you. If you violate a local 
law, you will be put in jail and kept in custody as long 
as possible. We will use every available statute. We will 
seek every prosecutorial advantage.”2
As the government adopted a no-tolerance policy, 
a fear-stricken public watched as images of nefarious 
dark-skinned, bearded Muslims flashed across millions 
of television screens. The message was, if there had 
ever been any doubt, the 9/11 attacks confirmed that 
Muslims and Arabs are inherently violent and intent 
upon destroying the American way of life. Heightened 
scrutiny of these communities was thus perceived not 
only as warranted, but also as a rational3 response to 
an existential threat to the country.
Ten years later, the 9/11 terrorist attacks appear 
to have succeeded in transforming the American 
way of life for the worse.4 In our hasty passage of 
the expansive PATRIOT Act, our fears gave way to 
the government’s demand for unfettered discretion 
to preserve national security at the expense of civil 
liberties for all Americans. As a consequence, the 
United States has adopted practices commonly found 
in police states where government surveillance extends 
into almost every aspect of life.5
Body scans at airports strip us of our privacy. Fusion 
centers have sprung up across the country to gather and 
deposit intelligence on average Americans in massive 
government-monitored databases.6 Warrantless National 
Security Letters are used to obtain information about 
our financial and political lives, despite the absence of 
any evidence of criminal activity.7 Police departments 
have shifted resources from fighting crime to mapping 
communities based on their religion and ethnic origins 
under the auspices of protecting national security.8 The 
overreaching enforcement of broad “material support 
to terrorism” laws has chilled religiously mandated 
charitable giving and hampered humanitarian aid 
operations, thereby eroding the independence of the 
American nonprofit sector and unduly politicizing 
humanitarian assistance.9 And fears of “homegrown 
terrorism,” fueled by irresponsible Congressional 
rhetoric,10 have legitimized a bigoted discourse on 
the country’s Muslims to such an extent that some 
Americans challenge Islam’s status as a bona fide 
religion deserving of constitutional protection.11
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At first glance, the preventive paradigm appears 
facially legitimate. Few would contest the collective 
public safety interest in stopping terrorism before it 
occurs. even so, at what point should the government be 
permitted to investigate individuals? Does mere political 
dissent, even if virulently anti-American, or unpopular 
orthodox religious practices suffice to subject individuals 
to heightened scrutiny or a loss of liberty? At what 
point does legitimate counterterrorism become political 
and religious persecution? The answers determine 
the type of country we want to live in: a free and just 
society consistent with the Founding Fathers’ vision, 
or a paranoid society dislodged from its fundamental 
principles of fairness and the rule of law.
While post-9/11 preventive counterterrorism policies 
have adversely impacted various groups of Americans, 
no group has been as deeply affected as the Muslim 
community, especially its Arab and South Asian 
members.12 Mosque infiltration has become so rampant 
that congregants assume they are under surveillance 
as they fulfill their spiritual and religious obligations.13 
Government informants have ensnared numerous 
seemingly hapless and unsophisticated young men, 
thereby sowing distrust among Muslims.14 Aggressive 
prosecutions of Muslim charities and individuals across 
the country have embittered communities that feel 
besieged by their government and distrusted by their 
non-Muslim compatriots.15 As most clearly evinced 
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in the vitriolic discourse surrounding the Park 51 
Community Center in lower Manhattan during 2010, 
selective counterterrorism enforcement has also fueled 
public bias against Muslims.16 As a consequence, the 
vibrancy and development of civil society within these 
communities is at risk of being significantly stunted.
This article focuses on the use of material support 
laws in the counterterrorism preventive paradigm and 
the significant risk they pose to the civil rights and 
civil liberties of those communities most targeted: 
Muslim Arabs and South Asians. The wide-reaching 
and devastating effects of these broadly interpreted 
material support laws on American Muslim charities 
and their donors, as well as on the broader American 
nonprofit sector, has effectively criminalized otherwise 
legitimate charitable giving, peace-building efforts, and 
human rights advocacy.
To the extent that these groups are the “miner’s 
canary”17 in forecasting the post-9/11 loss of civil 
rights and liberties for all Americans, their experiences 
demonstrate the United States’ downward progression 
away from the Founding Fathers’ vision of a society where 
individuals can speak, assemble, and practice their faith 
free of government intervention or persecution.18
uSing material Support  
aS a preventive 
counterterroriSm tool
The linchpin of the preventive counterterrorism 
paradigm consists of those laws that prohibit providing 
material support to terrorism. These laws are often 
the fall-back criminal provisions employed when the 
government cannot prove terrorism charges. But they 
are so broad and vaguely worded that they effectively 
criminalize a myriad of activities that would otherwise be 
constitutionally protected. Moreover, as the government 
is not statutorily required to prove that the defendant had 
a specific intent to support terrorism, it has carte blanche 
to prosecute a broad range of legitimate activities, such 
as charitable giving, peace building, and human rights 
advocacy. The Department of Justice, with the Supreme 
Court’s blessing, has consequently criminalized 
training and advocacy in support of nonviolence on the 
justification that such activities legitimize a designated 
group or individual.19 The government’s standards for 
what it deems as “legitimizing”20 are so broad that then-
Solicitor General elena Kagan went so far as to call for 
prosecuting lawyers for filing an amicus brief on behalf 
of a terrorist organization.21
Similarly, humanitarian aid delivered to noncombatant 
civilians living under the control of a terrorist organization 
can be illegal based upon the unproven theory that 
it frees up resources to redirect toward violence. 
This untenable theory of liability, also known as the 
“fungibility” doctrine,22 punitively denies many innocent 
beneficiaries abroad of food, water, and shelter. But 
for their misfortune of being trapped in a conflict zone 
where one party is designated as terrorist, these civilians 
would have received much-needed aid from American 
civil society. Furthermore, Muslim American charities 
providing the humanitarian aid are punished through 
government-led smear campaigns23 and prosecutions.
DiSproportionate enforcement 
againSt muSlim charitieS
W ith few exceptions, the executive branch has exercised its broad discretion to selectively 
target Muslim charities engaged in seemingly legitimate 
humanitarian aid.24 The result is a serious chilling effect 
on Muslim communities’ willingness to openly partake 
in political dissent and for Muslim charities to effectively 
provide international aid using religiously mandated 
charitable donations to places like Somalia.25
Since 9/11, Muslim donors have been scared to make 
such contributions because they fear prosecution for 
providing material support to terrorism even though 
they do not intend to support terrorism. They also fear 
that their donations will invite government scrutiny and 
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harassment in the form of tax audits, immigration checks, 
requests for voluntary FBI interviews, inclusion on watch 
lists, and surveillance.26 Indeed, donations to Muslim 
charities fell precipitously in the years immediately 
following 9/11.27 As law enforcement increasingly 
questions Muslims about such donations during 
voluntary interviews, immigration benefit proceedings, 
and at the border, this chilling effect is magnified.28 Ten 
years after 9/11, many Muslim charities still struggle to 
return to pre-9/11 donation levels.29
The government’s closure and designation as terrorist 
of three of the largest Muslim American charities 
in the first three months after the 9/11 attacks sent 
shockwaves through Muslim communities nationwide.30 
In December 2001 during Ramadan, when Muslim 
charitable giving is at its yearly peak, the government 
froze the assets of the Holy Land Foundation for Relief 
and Development, the Global Relief Foundation, and 
the Benevolence International Foundation.31 The 
subsequent criminal prosecution of their officers, 
board members, employees, and even contracted 
fundraisers in the United States alarmed Muslim 
donors, who reasonably feared that even the most 
tenuous association with a Muslim charity could lead 
to ruinous consequences.32 Currently, seven out of the 
nine charities shut down as a result of terrorism-related 
investigation or designation are Muslim charities.33
Shutting Down charitieS  
baSeD on mere allegationS
U nbeknownst to many, a formal terrorist designation is not necessary to figuratively tar and feather a 
charity. A mere investigation by the Department of 
Treasury is enough to trigger the asset-freezing provision 
of sanctions laws,34 thus paralyzing the organization. The 
law does not require the Treasury Department to have 
probable cause of a violation of the regulations, nor is 
it required to seek approval from a judge, either before 
or after the freeze is imposed. The investigation and 
resulting freeze have no limits. The ensuing public media 
coverage then puts the nail in the organization’s coffin, 
as any individual’s subsequent association with it is an 
invitation for government scrutiny, if not prosecution. 
Before December 2010, such organizations were denied 
access to their funds to hire a defense lawyer unless 
the Department of Treasury, the adverse party in any 
litigation, authorized such expenditures. The department 
often approved small amounts that were a fraction of 
the cost of hiring competent counsel.35
Despite numerous requests to allow lawyers to 
represent the accused without a license, new regulations 
were issued only after the American Civil Liberties Union 
and Center for Constitutional Rights challenged the 
existing regulations in connection with the Al-Aulaqi 
suit.36 Prior to the change, attorneys were permitted to 
provide uncompensated legal services to designated 
terrorist organizations without first obtaining a license 
from OFAC under a very limited set of circumstances.37 
Compensated services were also severely restricted, 
permitting charities to only fund their legal services 
through money raised outside the U.S. or, after obtaining 
a license, money raised by legal defense funds.38
The new regulations, issued in December 2010 in 
response to the Al-Aulaqi litigation, finally permitted 
American lawyers to provide pro bono representation 
in any proceeding before a court of agency (federal, 
state, or local), without obtaining a license.39 The 
new regulations also permit charities or persons to 
pay for legal services without obtaining a license if 
the services involve, among other things, counseling 
on the requirements of compliance with American 
law, representation of persons named as defendants 
in American legal proceedings, and “any other legal 
services where U.S. law requires access to legal 
counsel at public expense.”40 However, if the needed 
legal services are not pro bono and do not fall into the 
categories of exceptions, the charity or person must 
still obtain a license.
In addition to the seven shut down Muslim American 
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charities,41 another six have found themselves at the 
center of publicly announced terrorism investigations, 
raids, and surveillance.42 Unable to overcome the 
resulting stigma and blacklisting, two of them have 
permanently closed without ever being designated as 
terrorist organizations.43
guilt without proof  
of wrongDoing
Despite the statute’s clear meaning, some courts have interpreted material support laws in a way 
that relieves prosecutors from having to prove that a 
charity provided donations directly to a designated 
foreign terrorist organization.
In the Holy Land Foundation criminal case, a federal 
district court in Texas instructed the jury that provision 
of humanitarian aid to non-governmental groups 
abroad not designated as terrorist organizations makes 
American charities and their officers guilty of material 
support to terrorism if those groups are later shown to 
be fronts for, or controlled by, a designated terrorist 
organization.44 Defendants were convicted based on 
their donations to local zakat committees45 that provided 
direct humanitarian aid to impoverished Palestinians in 
the West Bank and Gaza. The zakat committees, which 
are not designated terrorist organizations, were the 
indigenous nonprofit organizations with the necessary 
network to distribute aid. Indeed, the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID) and the 
International Red Cross (IRC) often worked with the 
same zakat committees to deliver aid to Palestinians.46
Despite USAID and IRC’s similar work in the 
Palestinian territories, the Holy Land Foundation (HLF) 
and its Muslim officers were convicted of providing 
material support to Hamas, a designated terrorist group, 
on account of donations to the undesignated zakat 
committees. The trial court erroneously instructed 
the jury that if some individuals in some of the zakat 
committees had some association with Hamas, these 
donations constituted prohibited material support to 
Hamas, even if the American charity lacked knowledge 
of such associations. Although the government could not 
prove that HLF’s donations were transferred to Hamas or 
that HLF knew or should have known of some of these 
committees’ alleged ties to Hamas, it was found guilty 
based on its contribution to the undesignated groups. 
This tenuous, and arguably unconstitutional, theory of 
liability ultimately exposes all American humanitarian aid 
agencies operating in conflict zones where designated 
terrorist groups exist. That USAID can engage in the 
same activity without sanction further evinces the 
politicization of humanitarian aid.
The serious legal implications caused twenty of the 
United States’ largest nonprofits and foundations to file 
an amicus brief in the Holy Land Foundation case asking 
the Fifth Circuit to interpret the material support statute to 
require proof of knowledge that a recipient of assistance 
is a designated group or is controlled by one.47 Amici 
argued that the district court’s jury instructions denied 
individuals fair notice of what is prohibited and failed 
to require proof of individual culpability. If the district 
court’s flawed interpretation is upheld on appeal, they 
argued, it “would jeopardize the legitimate charitable 
work of countless foundations and charities throughout 
the United States.”48 Specifically, the material support 
statute’s reach would expand exponentially such that all 
organizations engaged in humanitarian assistance would 
be exposed to prosecution.49 Ultimately, the chilling 
effect would devastate their important work and deny 
beneficiaries humanitarian aid.50
Notably, the amici included such large and reputable 
nonprofit organizations as the Carter Center, the 
Rockefeller Brothers Fund, the Constitution Project, 
the Council on Foundations, and the Samuel Rubin 
Foundation.51 Their participation demonstrates these 
laws’ broader adverse consequences, notwithstanding 
their selective enforcement against Muslim groups and 
individuals. Ultimately, the Department of Treasury and 
the Department of Justice’s refusal to transition from 
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their current draconian strategy to a transparent and 
fair process collectively weakens American civil society.
Although material support laws were initially enforced 
against Muslim communities, aggressive prosecution has 
since spread to other groups as the government seeks to 
convince the public that it is actively protecting national 
security. The 2010 Supreme Court ruling in Holder v. 
Humanitarian Law Project brought to light the broad-
reaching adverse implications of the laws prohibiting 
material support to terrorism. The plaintiffs, a former 
federal administrative law judge and American-based 
advocacy groups, sought to train the Kurdistan Workers’ 
Party in Turkey (PKK), a designated foreign terrorist 
organization.52 While the PKK engaged in violent activities, 
the plaintiffs expressly sought to train members on how 
to use humanitarian and international law to peacefully 
resolve disputes and petition for humanitarian relief before 
the United Nations and other representative bodies.53
To the dismay of many peace building and humanitarian 
aid organizations, the Supreme Court found that the law 
criminalizing the plaintiffs’ activities is constitutional.54 In 
a stinging dissent, Justice Breyer criticized the majority’s 
failure to differentiate between aiding terrorist groups that 
engage in violent terrorist acts and those that participate 
in legitimate democracy-building advocacy that, in 
effect, decreases terrorism.55 The ruling criminalized 
the plaintiffs’ efforts to stop the groups’ violent activities 
and promote peaceful advocacy, thereby making it illegal 
for Americans to teach groups to put down their guns, 
pick up their pens, invoke international human rights 
law, and seek redress through international tribunals.
The criminalization of aid and advocacy directly 
contradicts our nation’s stated commitment to 
international human rights law and sends a message 
to the world that the United States is not serious about 
human rights and peaceful conflict resolution. Moreover, 
the ruling undermines American civil society, for its 
independent nonprofit sector plays a pivotal role in 
international peace-building efforts and the provision 
of humanitarian aid to impoverished civilians trapped 
in conflict zones.56 However, the Court’s interpretation 
of the material support laws now limits international 
peace-building efforts to highly politicized, and often 
ineffective, government programs sponsored by the 
U.S. Department of State or USAID.
Ultimately, this current formulation and interpretation 
of material support laws undermines our nation’s 
reputation in the international community, our national 
security interests in minimizing violence and terrorism 
abroad, and our own civil society.57
collateral proSecution  
anD the Surveillance of  
muSlim DonorS
W hile few individual donors have been prosecuted for material support arising out of the charities’ 
prosecutions,58 many have experienced collateral 
prosecution59 on account of their donations to charities 
under investigation or being prosecuted.60 The resulting 
fear of collateral adverse consequences is striking and 
significantly undermines donors’ confidence in the 
government’s interest in protecting their fundamental 
right to religious freedom.61 Muslim donors worry that 
once the government becomes aware of their donations 
to Muslim charities, especially to those engaged in 
humanitarian relief efforts abroad, they will become 
targets of investigation and prosecution. They fear 
that the government uses the donor lists of charities, 
either designated or under investigation, as a starting 
point for investigating terrorism, even if they have no 
individualized evidence of wrongdoing.62 Hence these 
lists are suspected of serving as the starting point for 
fishing expeditions in search of terrorists.
Unlikely a coincidence, major donors have 
experienced burdensome tax audits, denials of 
citizenship applications, deportation proceedings, and 
surveillance.63 Major donors have also been targeted 
for interviews regarding their donations and knowledge 
of Muslim charities’ activities locally and nationally.64 
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Complaints about such targeting have been documented 
by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), the Asian 
Law Caucus, Muslim Advocates, the Arab American 
Anti-Discrimination Committee, and other advocacy 
groups representing these communities.65 Some of these 
interviews are involuntary, as they occur at the border 
when individuals attempt to return from abroad.66 Others 
are a result of ubiquitous FBI requests for voluntary 
interviews, which many community members accept 
without legal representation as an earnest, but ill-advised, 
gesture to prove their innocence. The ACLU, for instance, 
has documented reports of law enforcement targeting 
Muslim donors in Texas, Michigan, New York, Virginia, 
Florida, Louisiana, California, Minnesota, Missouri, and 
Wisconsin through “voluntary” interviews.67 Many of 
the interviews resulted in criminal charges for material 
false statements unrelated to terrorist activities.68 
Such non-terrorist-related charges have confirmed the 
community’s concerns about selective prosecution due 
to one’s religious and/or political beliefs.
These fears of increased government scrutiny and 
surveillance are fueled by a prevalent perception that 
the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) and local 
police agents are omnipresent in mosques in cities 
with large Muslim populations.69 Muslim congregants 
have complained to advocacy groups of FBI informants 
infiltrating their mosques to monitor speech, sermons, 
and charitable giving within the mosque.70 For instance, 
the FBI continued to monitor a mosque in Albany for 
years after 9/11, despite arresting and deporting the 
original target of the investigation.71 Agents even went 
so far as to install cameras aimed at the mosque’s 
front and rear entrances with questions of whether 
the mosque was also bugged going unanswered.72 
Moreover, congregants report being pressured to serve 
as informants in exchange for relief from heightened 
governmental scrutiny.73 Numerous news reports on 
coercive recruitment tactics and pervasive mosque 
surveillance reinforce Muslims’ perceptions that the FBI 
monitors donations given in the mosque.74 The adverse 
effect of this discriminatory targeting of American Muslim 
charities providing humanitarian aid to Muslim regions 
abroad does more than just chill religious freedom;75 it 
undermines the country’s credibility in its publicized 
outreach initiative to Muslims and ultimately impedes its 
foreign policy prerogatives in the Middle east. Moreover, 
Muslims abroad view such treatment as a litmus test 
of American sincerity vis-à-vis its various international 
initiatives, such as democratization projects, the defense 
of human rights, and the strengthening of civil society. 
When they see discrimination against Muslims in the 
United States, they reasonably question the legitimacy 
of its proclaimed leadership in supporting liberal 
democratic ideals. Such double-talk, therefore, renders 
this country irrelevant at best, or obstructionist at worst, 
in international forums addressing anti-discrimination, 
human rights, and the rule of law.
feaSible SolutionS rejecteD  
by the government
In response to this draconian process, the Charity & Security Network, a broad coalition of highly regarded 
nonprofit organizations, has urged the Department of 
Treasury to implement due process protections during 
the designation and investigation process.76
Current law prevents a designated nonprofit 
organization from meaningfully defending itself.77 The 
organization is designated and its assets frozen without 
notice or opportunity to defend itself before the fact. The 
absence of a mechanism comparable to the Classified 
Information Procedures Act used in the criminal context 
that allows defendants to confront classified evidence 
prevents the nonprofit organization from reviewing the 
entire record of evidence used against it for designation. 
Nor is it permitted to offer evidence in its own defense 
at the pre-designation or federal appeals phase.78 Such 
minimal due process rights undermine the legitimacy of 
the process. Indeed some question whether designation 
is more about politics than the law.79
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Rather than adopt a draconian designation 
process that assumes guilt without the benefit of the 
organization’s defense, designated groups should 
be afforded a meaningful opportunity to defend 
themselves promptly in the wake of an asset freeze. 
This would require the government to disclose sufficient 
information regarding its classified case. It should also 
be obligatory for the government to provide notice of 
the charges and a statement of the reasons, neither 
of which is currently required.
Thoughtful solutions by highly skilled attorneys have 
been proposed on numerous occasions and blithely 
dismissed by Department of Treasury and White House 
officials. Officials often cite the ease with which an 
organization may transfer money abroad to avoid having 
its assets frozen for illicit acts.80 While such concerns 
are reasonable, they too can be addressed without 
compromising the nonprofit organization’s due process 
rights. An independent conservator could be appointed 
to oversee the charity’s finances pending investigation. 
This option assures the government that funds will not be 
transferred abroad out of their jurisdiction and prevents 
the collective punishment of the entire organization, as 
well as its donors and beneficiaries, on account of mere 
allegations. Likewise, its investigations should adopt the 
same investigative techniques applied to corporations 
suspected of fraud, where the focus is on individual bad 
actors rather than the entire corporation. So long as the 
organization can show that it has acted in good faith 
and any wrongdoing was a result of a limited number 
of individuals, it should be spared total liquidation. This 
more reasonable approach not only protects charitable 
organizations, but also those of its beneficiaries who are 
in desperate need of humanitarian assistance.
Additionally, while the new regulations permitting a 
charity to pay for particular legal services are welcome, 
there is little justification for the government’s continued 
refusal to allow the undesignated charity access to its 
funds for those services that are not the focus of the 
investigation. especially in the case of large charities, 
operations expand into various countries, whereas the 
government’s concerns may be limited to only operations 
in a particular country or related to a specific project. The 
government has yet to provide a reasonable explanation, 
other than its punitive preventive philosophy, for shutting 
down an entire organization rather than stopping 
the activity being investigated. Moreover, once the 
government freezes the funds it refuses all requests to 
release them to other charitable organizations performing 
the same work in accordance with the cy pres principle.81 
Tellingly, the government would rather keep the funds 
frozen indefinitely with no regard for the needs of intended 
beneficiaries. Such contradictions evince the politicization 
of counterterrorism that, thus far, has most adversely 
impacted Muslim charities and donors.
At stake is far more than the due process rights 
of a particular organization and the sustainability of 
the nonprofit sector – both of which are important in 
their own right. But equally significant is the legitimacy 
of the U.S. government’s counterterrorism strategy. 
The material support laws and terrorist designation 
process has become unduly politicized as shown by 
overreaching, if not outright abusive, enforcement.
It is long overdue for the government to acknowledge 
failings of the designation regime and give serious thought 
to the thoughtful recommendations of the nonprofit sector.82
concluSion
Ten years after 9/11, the American government’s preventative counterterrorism strategy has cost 
millions of taxpayer dollars, diverted thousands of law 
enforcement personnel away from preventing non-
terrorism-related crimes, and failed to prevent terrorist 
attacks committed by Muslims and non-Muslims alike. 
Rather than engage in responsible governance and 
reassess failed strategies, it continues to employ fear-
based narratives to persuade the public to keep pouring 
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evidence of the failure of counterterrorism strategies is 
ample. The government has failed to prevent some of the 
most serious attempted terrorist plots over the past few 
years. But for a fortuitous technical failure and the rapid 
response of a Muslim Mauritanian reporting the smoke, 
thousands of people could have been killed in Times 
Square. Similarly, the Nigerian Christmas Day bomber 
would have successfully killed hundreds on an airplane 
headed for Detroit if his bomb had not failed to ignite. 
White supremacist James Cummings83 was actively 
constructing a lethal dirty bomb at home undetected 
by the FBI. Only after his wife shot him in self-defense 
did the government discover his terrorist plot. In other 
cases, terrorists succeeded in terrorizing the American 
public without government intervention. Joseph Stack 
flew an airplane into an IRS building in Austin, Texas, 
in protest of IRS demands that he pay his taxes.84 His 
terrorist attack killed an IRS employee who was a military 
veteran. Had the attack occurred at a different time of 
day, hundreds of IRS employees could have been killed. 
Jared Lee Loughner shot Congresswoman Gabrielle 
Giffords (D-AZ) and killed six people due to both his 
mental illness and questionable political objectives.85
While countering terrorism is no easy feat, it is 
remarkable that the government was unable to prevent 
these attacks after having invested so many resources 
into counterterrorism, often at the expense of the 
civil liberties of all Americans. Despite the creation of 
numerous fusion centers nationwide, the relaxation of 
surveillance laws,86 the use of technology to surveil nearly 
every aspect of life in this country, and the reallocation 
of thousands of agents to countering terrorism, the 
government has yet to show results proportionate to 
the monumental vested resources. In the apt words of 
David Cole and Jules Lobel, we have become both less 
safe and less free.87
What these strategies accomplish quite well is the 
stigmatization of more than 6 million Muslims in the 
United States because of the illegal acts of a handful of 
Muslims – some of whom are foreign and have no ties 
whatsoever to this country. Many American Muslims feel 
that they live a second-class existence because their 
houses of worship are more likely than others’ to be under 
surveillance and monitored. Their Internet activity is more 
likely to be under heightened scrutiny for any signs of 
political dissent. Their religious practices are under the 
microscope by purported terrorist experts who cannot 
tell the difference between orthodox Islamic practices 
and bona fide terrorist activity.88 And, Muslim women’s 
religious headwear is perceived as an insignia for terrorist 
inclinations that justify discriminatory treatment.89
Predictably, what started out as a focus on vulnerable 
religious and racial minorities has now spread to a 
broader segment of Americans. Laws prohibiting 
material support to terrorism that were initially applied to 
Muslim individuals and institutions are increasingly being 
enforced against various individuals and institutions 
engaged in humanitarian aid, peace building, and human 
rights advocacy. Non-Muslim activist groups who have 
been engaged in legitimate advocacy for decades are 
now being targeted for investigation and potential 
prosecution pursuant to material support to terrorism 
laws.90 A combination of public apathy about the state 
of civil liberties, pervasive stereotypes of Muslims as 
terrorists, and government misinformation about the 
efficacy of counterterrorism policies has facilitated 
increased surveillance and investigative authorities 
commonly found in police states.91
Perhaps the most troubling factor in recent national 
security discourse is the increasingly alarmist and overtly 
biased collective categorization of Muslims as terrorists. 
Specifically, Representative Peter King’s (R-NY) recent 
Congressional hearings, characterized as a political 
circus by some, legitimized America’s worst fears.92 
That American Muslims are so distrusted as to warrant 
hearings focused solely on questioning their loyalty is 
reminiscent of our nation’s collective punishment of 
Japanese Americans during WWII.
The silver lining in the disconcerting homegrown 
terrorism debates is the broad coalition of groups 
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that rejected King’s presumptions of collective guilt 
on Muslims on account of the bad acts of a few. 
Christian, Jewish, and civil rights groups representing 
a diversity of demographics challenged the merits of 
limiting “homegrown terrorism” to terrorism committed 
only by Muslims.93
Unfortunately, insufficient attention was paid to the 
importance of allowing Muslims, and all Americans in 
general, to express political dissent openly despite the 
unpopularity of their views. Instead, Muslim groups 
and their allies sought to reassure political leaders 
and a suspicious public of the Muslim Americans’ 
undying loyalty to the nation and their status as “model 
minorities.”94 Rather than focusing on the right of 
Americans, including Muslims, to be radical so long as 
their activities do not violate the law, the Muslim groups 
and their allies adopted King’s narrative to shape Muslim 
political beliefs and religious practices in accordance 
with a definition of a citizen who is passive toward their 
government. Indeed, the homegrown terrorism hearings 
were a missed opportunity to shift the focus on the 
fundamental American principle to hold unpopular or 
controversial views, rather than to prove the innocence 
of a suspected religious minority.
It is long past time for the government to reassess 
the successes and failures of its counterterrorism 
policies over the past ten years. Are we safer, or have 
we just been lucky? Has the PATRIOT Act made our 
government better able to prevent terrorism? Is it time for 
Americans, as members of Congress have proclaimed, 
to thoughtfully debate the Act’s efficacy and whether 
its infringements on all Americans’ civil liberties are 
warranted?95 Are we seeking to rationalize our forfeiture 
of civil liberties by convincing ourselves that our national 
security policies work, irrespective of the facts on the 
ground? If we cannot answer these questions with 
concrete evidence, then we have little to show for the 
last ten years of significant government expenditure, 
public anxiety, and the high civil liberties costs imposed 
on a significant number of Americans.
In light of our nation’s checkered civil rights record 
and ample opportunity to learn from the past, there is 
simply no excuse for repeating the same mistakes on 
yet another different and vulnerable minority group. 
Preventing a terrorist attack need not come at the 
expense of vilifying a religious minority. Nor should 
it require sacrificing this country’s most fundamental 
civil rights and liberties.
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